Äquivalenzprinzip und Finanzpolitik: Ein Besteuerungsprinzip (erneut) auf dem Prüfstand
Hansjürgens Bernd
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Hansjürgens Bernd: Philipps- Universität Marburg Abteilung für Finanzwissenschaft Am Plan 2, 35032 Marburg
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 1997, vol. 46, issue 3, 275-301
Abstract:
The article analyses the potential role of the benefit principle in public finance. Against the background that the benefit principle plays a minor part both in the theory and in the politics of public finance, first the advantages of this principle are traced out. By bringing together both sides of the budget the benefit principle leads to a stronger cost-benefit orientation in the citizen’s preferences and serves as an instrument to curb Leviathan. Given these advantages the arguments against the application of the benefit principle are critically (re)analysed and potential fields of a stronger application are developed. The analysis ends with the design of elements of a “constitutional pact” in order to strengthen the role of the benefit principle in public policy.
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:46:y:1997:i:3:p:275-301:n:4
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DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-1997-0304
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