Das Europäische System der Zentralbanken - ein Modell für ein Europäisches Kartellamt?

Duijm Bernhard
Additional contact information
Duijm Bernhard: Eberhard-Karls- Universität Tübingen Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät Abt. Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbes. Wirtschaftspolitik II Nauklerstraße 47 D - 72074 Tübingen

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 1998, vol. 47, issue 2, 123-141

Abstract: For a few years, especially German authorities have shown dissatisfaction over the enforcement of European competition policy, particularly the application of the Merger Regulation. German politicians and above all the President of the Bundeskartellamt (German Cartel Office) propose an independent European competition agency. This article asks whether the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) can be a model for an independent agency consisting of a European Cartel Office (ECO) and national cartel offices. This structure would make it easier to apply the principle of subsidiarity to European competition policy. Because of the differences between monetary and competition policy, it is necessary to modify the regulations concerning the ESCB before adopting them to competition policy.

Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/zfwp-1998-0202 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:47:y:1998:i:2:p:123-141:n:2

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/zfwp/html

DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-1998-0202

Access Statistics for this article

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik is currently edited by Juergen B. Donges, Steffen J. Roth, Achim Wambach and Christian Watrin

More articles in Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().