Lohnfortzahlung und Krankenstand

Boss Alfred
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Boss Alfred: Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel Düsternbrooker Weg 120 D-24105 Kiel

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 2000, vol. 49, issue 1, 27-50

Abstract: Sickness benefit income reduces an employee’s opportunity costs of absence from work. In the Federal Republic of Germany the institutional arrangement was changed several times during the 1951-1999 period. This paper investigates the effects on sick leave behavior. According to the empirical analysis, moral hazard is a serious problem in Germany. The paper discusses some institutional changes (including compulsory private insurance for the employed) which probably would reduce moral hazard significantly.

Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2000-0103

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