Rationale Wirtschaftspolitik in einem komplexen System

Streit Manfred E. ()
Additional contact information
Streit Manfred E.: Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Wirtschaftssystemen, Abteilung Institutionenökonomik und Wirtschaftspolitik, Kahlaische Str. 10, D - 07745 Jena

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 2001, vol. 50, issue 1, 68-76

Abstract: Starting point for the present analysis is the finding, that a market economy represents an interactive complex and open system. A discussion of these properties emphasised by systems theory leads to the result, that attempts to steer such a system by means of economic policy have to face narrow boundaries, which can only be surpassed by initiating unpredictable reactions of the system. As a consequence the steering knowledge is considered to be unsatisfactory from the point of view of an economic policy guided by the rationality principle. This leads to the question, how interventions should look like, which comply with the steering properties of the system. It requires a reformulation of the criterion of systems conformity by drawing on two processes, which govern the economic performance of the system. According to this criterion, interventions should neither interfere with the self-coordination of the actors nor with their self control by competitive action. Considering typical examples of interventions leads to the unpleasant result that there are good reasons to accept the hypothesis of rent-seeking as a salient feature of economic policy-making. Interventions emerge from the interaction between a rent-seeking lobby and rent-creating political actors. Finally considering scientific policy advice, a conflict between the advisor who himself has committed to systems conformity, and the advised political actor, who is involved in rent-creating, is bound to emerge. This conflict can only be solved by engaging in constitutional reforms, which change the incentive situation of political actors completely. However, such reforms are difficult to bring about, because they manifestly go against the interests of political actors who have to set their own constitutional rules.

Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/zfwp-2001-0105 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:50:y:2001:i:1:p:68-76:n:5

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyte ... ournal/key/zfwp/html

DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2001-0105

Access Statistics for this article

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik is currently edited by Juergen B. Donges, Steffen J. Roth, Achim Wambach and Christian Watrin

More articles in Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().