Die Psychologie begrenzt rationaler Wirtschaftspolitik: Das Beispiel des Reformstaus

Friedrich Heinemann

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 2001, vol. 50, issue 1, 96-112

Abstract: Mainstream economists are reluctant to integrate features of bounded rationality into their behavioural assumptions. However, particularly in the field of economic policy the scope for limited rationality is given, since voters lack incentives for rational reasoning concerning their voting decision. The explanatory power of limited rationality is demonstrated for the example of reform resistance. Status quo preferences, endowment effects and loss aversion are typical deviations from full rationality and explain resistance against beneficial reforms even if there is full information and no uncertainty. From this psychological perspective, a major precondition for the implementation of reforms is the loss of status quo as an available option. Test runs of policy options may also be helpful for overcoming psychological reform resistance.

Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/zfwp-2001-0107 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:50:y:2001:i:1:p:96-112:n:7

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/zfwp/html

DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2001-0107

Access Statistics for this article

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik is currently edited by Juergen B. Donges, Steffen J. Roth, Achim Wambach and Christian Watrin

More articles in Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().