Zur Lage auf dem Arbeitsmarkt: Reformvorschläge in der Diskussion

Eekhoff Johann (), Wolfgang Franz and Alexander Spermann
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Eekhoff Johann: Universität zu Köln, Wirtschaftspolitisches Seminar, WiSo-Hochhaus, 7. Stock, D - 50923 Köln

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 2002, vol. 51, issue 2, 172-198

Abstract: Johann Eekhoff deals with the employment of low skilled workers. He recommends not to subsidize recipients of social security, but to offer them unpaid jobs, so that they get a chance to render their services in return of the received social aid, to train their skills, and to improve their prospect of getting a regular job. Monetary incentives for work are not compatible with the system of social security, and they are not necessary. The main problem is not willingness to work but the denial of jobs for low skilled workers in a society with strong labor unions and restrictive regulations. Charitable employment is one way to relieve the problems of unemployed recipients of social security, to increase employment, and to reduce public spending.In his paper Wolfgang Franz points out „The Need to more Flexibility on Labor Markets in Germany”. He determinates that an important aspect distinguishes the time pattern of unemployment in Germany from that in other countries such as the United States. After a recession unemployment rates in Germany do not decline to pre-recession levels. This raises the suspicion that ratchet effects are at work. Besides an unadequate wage policy several malfunctionings of the institutional framework of the labor market are highlighted in his paper mostly associated with labor laws such as lay-off restraints, insufficient decentralized.Alexander Sperman is writing about the improving financial incentives by the Mainz employee subsidy model - a placebo pill for low qualified workers? He determinates that the Mainz employee subsidy model was introduced in March 2002. It implies a time-restricted, degressive employee subsidy that subsidizes a part of employee’s social insurance contributions for a maximum of three years. In his paper he points out the enormous bureaucratic effort associated with paying back social contributions. A much more simplier and cost effective measure to reach the same goal would be to reduce the burden of social insurance contributions directly rather than indirectly. But for political economic reasons the chosen procedure could be reasonable. Furthermore, the introduction of the Mainz model was premature because evaluation results of field experiments with a couple of employee subsidy models are still missing. Therefore, the Mainz model could easily be a placebo pill for the low qualified workers as well as „Red Bull” for the government in election times.

Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2002-0204

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