Eine Welt voller Clubs

Klaus Zimmermann and Schemm-Gregory Reto ()
Additional contact information
Schemm-Gregory Reto: Institut für Finanzwissenschaft, Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg, Holstenhofweg 85, D - 22043 Hamburg

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 2005, vol. 54, issue 2, 230-264

Abstract: The economic theory of clubs can offer eminent contributions to an efficient shaping of processes of integration, especially at the level of the European Union. To determine a welfare maximum in a world full of clubs, the distinction between the within-club point of view and the total economy point of view plays a decisive role. The article tackles this conflict in already existing clubs realizing their optimal size in connection with the principle-agent-problem between club members and club managers. Including the indivisibility problem of individuals and clubs in a more realistic perspective leads to a further problem typical for welfare maximization in a world full of full (i.e. optimally sized) clubs: the situation of those who will not be provided with the club goods. Three possible options taking care of those unprovisioned are distinguished, and it is analyzed how these options affect individual and social net benefit. It is shown that the efficiency of these options decisively depends on the within-club or total economy perspective implying specific principal-agent-problems. Some economic policy conclusions are drawn at the end applying the Frey/Eichenberger-Model of Functional Overlapping Competing Jurisdiction to the European Integration Process.

Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/zfwp-2005-0206 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
Working Paper: Eine Welt voller Clubs (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:54:y:2005:i:2:p:230-264:n:6

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/zfwp/html

DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2005-0206

Access Statistics for this article

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik is currently edited by Juergen B. Donges, Steffen J. Roth, Achim Wambach and Christian Watrin

More articles in Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().