Eine effiziente vertikale Verteilung der Exekutivkompetenzen bei der Regulierung von Telekommunikationsmärkten in Europa

Justus Haucap and Kühling Jürgen ()
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Kühling Jürgen: Universität Karlsruhe, Zentrum für angewandte Rechtswissenschaft (ZAR), Institut für Informationsrecht, Fasanengarten 5, Geb. 50.31, 76128 Karlsruhe

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 2006, vol. 55, issue 3, 324-356

Abstract: The present paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages of centralising regulatory competencies in the European telecommunications sector. As we demonstrate, political economy suggests that an over- rather than an under-regulation of telecommunications markets has to be expected. This tendency has been strengthened by the allocation of competencies under the new regulatory framework which endows the European Commission with far reaching veto rights under the so-called article 7 procedure. In order to delimit the risk of over-regulation through institutional safeguards, it should be easier for regulators to deregulate than to regulate a market. Current suggestions and ambitions by the Commission to extend its veto right or to even establish a European regulator for telecommunications should be dismissed. Instead, we suggest limiting the Commission’s veto rights to (a) markets, in which regulation creates significant international externalities and (b) cases, where national regulators do not move into the direction of deregulation. If, however, a national regulator decides to deregulate a market, the Commission’s ex ante veto right should be abandoned (but ex post intervention by the Commission still be possible) in order not to hamper deregulation which tends to be the desired result, in principle.

Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2006-0307

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