Leviathan Europa – Stärkung der Nationalstaaten und der EU durch konstitutionelle Schranken?

Bodo Knoll and Koenig Andreas ()
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Koenig Andreas: Institut fur Volkswirtschaftslehre (520D), Universitat Hohenheim, D-70593 Stuttgart; Tel.: (0711) 459-23050

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 2011, vol. 60, issue 2, 127-145

Abstract: The uncontrolled centralization of competences on the European level is problematic insofar as it does not correspond to the citizens’ preferences. Constitutional constraints can prove essential for the freedom and the welfare of EU citizens. Existing constraints like the subsidiarity principle, the Council’s qualified-majority voting threshold, the checks and balances between different institutions, and the constitutional courts are not sufficient. Sunset competences, opting-out rights of the Member States, and the introduction of „Functional, Overlapping, and Competing Jurisdictions“ could strengthen institutional competition within the EU in order to shape the Union’s and Member States’ policies more according to citizens’ preferences.

Date: 2011
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Working Paper: Leviathan Europa - Stärkung der Nationalstaaten und der EU durch konstitutionelle Schranken? (2010)
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DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2011-0202

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