Spieltheoretische Analyse der (impliziten) Koordination von Benzinpreiserhöhungen am deutschen Tankstellenmarkt

Haaker Andreas ()
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Haaker Andreas: Grundsatzfragen der internationalen Rechnungslegung, DGRV – Deutscher Genossenschafts-und Raiffeisenverband e. V., Pariser Platz 3, 10117 Berlin, zugleich Habilitand am Lehrstuhl für Betriebswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftsprüfung,an der FernUniversität in Hagen

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 2012, vol. 61, issue 3, 320-336

Abstract: In a recent study, the Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) came to the conclusion that the oligopolistic market for petrol in Germany enables the oil companies to coordinate prices at petrol stations. In particular, prices are increased uniformly and on a regular basis on Fridays and just before public holidays. In this essay, possible coordination mechanisms, and their implications, will be analyzed with the aid of game-theoretical instruments. In line with the limits of game theory (Rubinstein, 1991), the empirical question of how (implicit) coordination mechanisms are applied in practice, and their political consequences, will not be examined in detail.

Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2012-0309

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