Die Effizienz von Zuteilungsmechanismen bei Flächenzertifikaten zwischen Versteigerung und Grandfathering – experimentelle Evidenz

Proeger Till (), Meub Lukas, Bizer Kilian and Ralph Henger
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Proeger Till: Universität Göttingen, Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftspolitik und Mittelstandsforschung, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, 37073GöttingenGermany, Tel.: 0551 3912330
Meub Lukas: Universität Göttingen, Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftspolitik und Mittelstandsforschung, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, 37073GöttingenGermany
Bizer Kilian: Universität Göttingen, Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftspolitik und Mittelstandsforschung, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, 37073GöttingenGermany

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 2017, vol. 66, issue 1, 80-109

Abstract: Tradable planning permits are discussed as a regulatory means of lowering land use in Germany. However, there are no empirical studies on the welfare- and distributional consequences of a cap & trade system for land use. Particularly the efficiency of different mechanisms for allocating certificates has – albeit politically relevant – not been investigated empirically. The present study deploys an economic experiment to simulate a system of tradable planning permits. We thus investigate the effects of three mechanisms of initial allocations: full grandfathering, full auctioning and an equal share of grandfathering and auctioning. We find that an auctioning mechanism lowers both efficiency and stability of a certificate system. Prices are more volatile and there are stronger distributional effects in favor of the auctioneer than expectable from theory. Persistent price differences between the auctions and trading prevent the efficient allocation of certificates. While the certificate system is highly efficient given full grandfathering, an auction mechanism is shown to lead to inefficiencies, instability and substantial distributional effects. Consequently, from an economic policy perspective our results support the full grandfathering in a system of tradable planning permits to reduce land use.

Keywords: auction; economic experiment; grandfathering; initial allocation; land use; tradable planning permits; Flächenverbrauch; Grandfathering; handelbare Flächenzertifikate; ökonomisches Experiment; Versteigerung; Zuteilungsmechanismen; auction; economic experiment; grandfathering; initial allocation; land use; tradable planning permits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 Q57 R14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Die Effizienz von Zuteilungsmechanismen bei Flächenzertifikaten zwischen Versteigerung und Grandfathering: Experimentelle Evidenz (2015)
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DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2017-0001

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