Streik und Ultima-Ratio: Was bringt eine obligatorische Schlichtung von Tarifkonflikten?

Lesch Hagen ()
Additional contact information
Lesch Hagen: Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln Themencluster Arbeitswelt & Tarifpolitik Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 21 50668 Köln Deutschland

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 2024, vol. 73, issue 3, 219-231

Abstract: Strikes in ‘critical infrastructure’, particularly in the transport sector, regularly affect uninvolved third parties. Furthermore, trade unions use the conflict to recruit members. This raises the question of whether the strike takes sufficient account of the ultima ratio principle. In the political debate, various parties are calling for the ultima ratio principle to be strengthened by a legally prescribed, mandatory mediation regulation. In collective bargaining practice, mediation has proven to be a successful instrument for resolving disputes. However, this has taken place on the basis of voluntary agreements between the social partners. In some sectors there are permanently established mediation boards, while in others mediation takes place on an ad hoc basis. There are also sectors in which the collective bargaining parties deliberately refrain from mediation because they prefer autonomous solutions. Mandatory mediation would not take account of this diversity of negotiating cultures. Instead, there is a risk of forced pro-forma mediation that fails. A strengthening of the ultima ratio concept would not be achieved. However, this does not rule out legislative action. It would be conceivable to introduce a legal framework for labour disputes for the ‘critical infrastructure’. This could also include a requirement to establish mediation regulations under collective agreements. How far-reaching these regulations then turn out to be, however, should be a matter for the social partners.

Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/zfwp-2024-2018 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:73:y:2024:i:3:p:219-231:n:1005

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/zfwp/html

DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2024-2018

Access Statistics for this article

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik is currently edited by Juergen B. Donges, Steffen J. Roth, Achim Wambach and Christian Watrin

More articles in Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().