Variable Sperrklauseln in Parlamenten am Beispiel der Bundestagswahl 2021

Hiller Tobias ()
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Hiller Tobias: Universität Leipzig Institut für Theoretische Volkswirtschaftslehre Leipzig Deutschland

Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 2025, vol. 74, issue 1, 63-76

Abstract: An electoral threshold is a provision in a proportional representation system where parties below a certain share of all votes are not taken into account in the allocation of mandates. However, electoral thresholds also cause distortions and mean that not all the votes of those entitled to vote are taken into account. These two effects must be weighed up against each other when introducing electoral thresholds. Hiller (2023) introduced a concept based on cooperative game theory to measure the difficulties in forming coalition governments. One possible application of this concept is the determination of the electoral threshold in the aftermath of an election with the aim of not exceeding a defined difficulty in forming a coalition government. We exemplify this idea for the election to the German Bundestag 2021.

Keywords: Abstimmungsmacht; Sperrklauseln (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2024-2022

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