Using Satisficing Game Theory for Performance Evaluation of Banks’ Branches (Case Study in the Mellat Bank)

Atefeh Kahfi, Ramin Sadeghian and Nasim Darabi
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Atefeh Kahfi: Bank Mellat
Ramin Sadeghian: Department of Industrial Engineering, Payame Noor University
Nasim Darabi: Bank Mellat

Journal of Money and Economy, 2020, vol. 15, issue 2, 135-150

Abstract: Due to its role in the identification of inefficient branches and deciding the consistency of their activities, evaluating the performance of a bank's branches is one of the most important decisions in the field of development and regulation of branch network. In this paper, the satisfactory functions based on game theory

Keywords: Performance Evaluation; Individual and Within-Group Evaluation; Satisficing Game Theory; Cooperative Game Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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