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Identification of Moral Hazard in the Banking System of Iran

Mahshid Shahchera (), Shirin Arbabian () and Mahdieh Shadrokh ()
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Mahshid Shahchera : Monetary and Banking Research Institute (MBRI), Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran (CBI)
Shirin Arbabian : Ashrafi Isfahani Institute, Isfahan
Mahdieh Shadrokh : Tarbiat Modares University

Journal of Money and Economy, 2013, vol. 8, issue 3, 63-87

Abstract: The presence of moral hazard in the banking sector can have worrying results. This paper examines the role of government guarantees to banks in generating moral hazard in Iran. We test for moral hazard among bank creditors by determining whether protected banks received more funds from creditors than non-protected banks. Empirically, to determine the existence of moral hazard among bank managers, we examine whether managers of protected banks had more risk than their counterparts at non-protected banks. Using panel data, we find stronger evidence of moral hazard among bank managers than bank creditors. We test for moral hazard among bank managers by using the capital ratio as bank risk variable. The coefficient of the lag of capital ratio is significant. This is strong evidence for the existence of moral hazard among bank managers. The coefficient of loan asset ratio is negative and significant. Banks managers decrease bank lending in risky conditions. The coefficient of the Debt to Central Bank variable is significantly negative, suggesting that the Government protected banks face lower risks. This is strong evidence for the existence of moral hazard among bank managers. As a robustness check, we used the Z-score instead of capital ratio for survey of the effect of moral hazard on bank risks. We used the Z-score as an alternative to capital ratio. This results show that there is strong evidence for the existence of moral hazard among bank managers.

Keywords: Moral hazard; Bank managers; Bank creditors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 E44 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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