Centralized Wage Setting and Monetary Policy in a Reputational Equilibrium

Guido Tabellini

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1988, vol. 20, issue 1, 102-18

Abstract: This paper analyzes a repeated game between the central bank and a centralized trade union. The central bank would be better off if it could commit to a noninflationary strategy. When this commitment is not enforceable, a noninflationary equilibrium can still be sustained by a reputational mechanism if the central bank has superior information about its own objective function. The qualitative properties of this reputational equilibrium are shown to differ from the cases considered in the existing literature where the central bank was modeled as playing a game against competitive labor markets. Copyright 1988 by Ohio State University Press.

Date: 1988
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Working Paper: Centralized Wage Setting and Monetary Policy in a Reputational Equilibrium (1985)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:20:y:1988:i:1:p:102-18

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