The Influence of the Federal Advisory Council on Monetary Policy

Thomas Havrilesky

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1990, vol. 22, issue 1, 37-50

Abstract: The Federal Advisory Council consists of twelve bankers, elected by Federal Reserve Bank directorates, who advise the Federal Open Market Committee every three months on their desired direction for monetary policy. This paper tests the conjecture that the Council's directives to the Committee contain information that predicts subsequent changes in interest rates and Committee directives. Regression equations and Granger causality tests do not disprove the conjecture. This is the first hard evidence of private interest group influence on monetary policy. Copyright 1990 by Ohio State University Press.

Date: 1990
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:22:y:1990:i:1:p:37-50

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