The Objectives and Priorities of Monetary Policy under Different Federal Reserve Chairmen

David R Hakes

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1990, vol. 22, issue 3, 327-37

Abstract: This paper utilizes a monetary policy reaction function that relates policy intentions to forecasts of policy objectives. Estimates of this reaction function over the post-Accord period suggest that the Burns period was unique. While the Martin and Volcker periods were extremely similar, the Burns period was structurally distinct from both the Martin and Volcker periods. Further, model specifications that allow for an independent influence on monetary policy from different presidential administrations also imply that there are significant differences in monetary policy under different Fed chairmen. Copyright 1990 by Ohio State University Press.

Date: 1990
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2879%2819900 ... 0.CO%3B2-K&origin=bc full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:22:y:1990:i:3:p:327-37

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking is currently edited by Robert deYoung, Paul Evans, Pok-Sang Lam and Kenneth D. West

More articles in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking from Blackwell Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and Christopher F. Baum ().