Risk-Based Deposit Insurance: An Incentive Compatible Plan

Rowena Pecchenino

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1992, vol. 24, issue 4, 499-510

Abstract: This paper develops a model of a risk-based deposit insurance regulatory regime in which the insurer induces banks to reveal truthfully the riskiness of their portfolios and to protect adequately their creditors from loss. This scheme reduces the limits on stockholder liability, responds to changes in market conditions, and provides depositors with timely information on bank risk. Copyright 1992 by Ohio State University Press.

Date: 1992
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Related works:
Working Paper: RISK-BASED DEPOSIT INSURANCE: AN INCENTIVE CAMPATIBALE PLAN (1989)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:24:y:1992:i:4:p:499-510

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