Economics at your fingertips  

De Jure Interstate Banking: Why Only Now?

Edward Kane ()

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1996, vol. 28, issue 2, 141-61

Abstract: This paper tackles three tasks. It reviews the history of restrictions on interstate banking. It summarizes the provisions of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, underscoring the opt-in and opt-out lobbying pressure this act assigns to state legislatures. Finally, the paper develops a lobbying-pressure model designed to explain statutory changes in the framework of financial regulation. The model implies that de facto liberalization of a regulatory regime precedes its de jure liberalization. Once adopted, statutory restrictions on banks remain in place until technology and competitive regulatory enforcement have fashioned loopholes wide enough to reverse the statute-sponsoring balance of lobbying pressure. Copyright 1996 by Ohio State University Press.

Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (79) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) ... 0.CO%3B2-M&origin=bc full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking is currently edited by Robert deYoung, Paul Evans, Pok-Sang Lam and Kenneth D. West

More articles in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking from Blackwell Publishing
Series data maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing ().

Page updated 2017-09-29
Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:28:y:1996:i:2:p:141-61