Credibility, Reputation, and the Mexican Peso Crisis
Pierre-Richard Agénor () and
Paul Masson ()
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1999, vol. 31, issue 1, 70-84
A model emphasizing the tradeoff between the costs of changes of domestic interest rates and exchange rate stability is used to assess the role of credibility and reputational factors in the lead-up to the December 1994 crisis of the Mexican peso. Devaluation expectations are decomposed into the probability that the authorities do not truly put a high weight on exchange rate stability and the probability that an exogenous shock will make a devaluation the preferred policy. Estimates indicate that prior to the peso collapse there was no significant increase in devaluation fears and no perceived shift in the authorities' policy preferences. But the increase in the differential that occurred after the devaluation may have resulted from such a shift.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16) Track citations by RSS feed
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:31:y:1999:i:1:p:70-84
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking is currently edited by Robert deYoung, Paul Evans, Pok-Sang Lam and Kenneth D. West
More articles in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking from Blackwell Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing ().