Bank Ownership and Efficiency

Yener Altunbas, Lynne Evans and Philip Molyneux ()

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2001, vol. 33, issue 4, 926-54

Abstract: Agency issues associated with different types of firm ownership are an area of concern in many banking systems where state-owned banks operate alongside mutual and private-sector institutions. This paper uses a variety of approaches to model cost and profit inefficiencies as well as technical change for different ownership types in the German banking market. We find little evidence to suggest that privately owned banks are more efficient than their mutual and public-sector counterparts. While all three bank ownership types benefit from widespread economies of scale, inefficiency measures indicate that public and mutual banks have slight cost and profit advantages over their private sector competitors.

Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (269)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:33:y:2001:i:4:p:926-54

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking is currently edited by Robert deYoung, Paul Evans, Pok-Sang Lam and Kenneth D. West

More articles in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking from Blackwell Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and Christopher F. Baum ().