Signal Jamming in New Credit Markets

Eric Van Tassel ()

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2002, vol. 34, issue 2, 469-90

Abstract: This paper develops a simple two-period model in which a lender's credit operations in a new market end up externalizing information on borrowers' repayment capabilities. This information improves the competitive position of outside lenders by allowing them to enter the credit market with a more accurate description of potential clients. Equilibrium strategies are then identified where an inside lender chooses to offer a costly first-period contract with the explicit objective of distorting the quality of the external information flow in the second period.

Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:34:y:2002:i:2:p:469-90

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking is currently edited by Robert deYoung, Paul Evans, Pok-Sang Lam and Kenneth D. West

More articles in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking from Blackwell Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and Christopher F. Baum ().