Bank-Firm Relationships and Contagious Banking Crises

Mariassunta Giannetti

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2003, vol. 35, issue 2, 239-61

Abstract: This paper argues that in an open economy a banking system with close bank-firm relationships may be easily subject to contagious banking crises because it is difficult to distinguish between "crony capitalism" and "good" main bank relationships. 1 show that, if international investors cannot distinguish the bank type, the distinction between crony capitalism and good main bank relationships becomes very fuzzy. In particular, the model can explain sequences of bank defaults within a country, even if the insolvent banks are very few ex ante, as well as sequences of banking crises among countries that are equally rated by international investors, but indeed differ in the ex ante solvency of their banking system.

Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:35:y:2003:i:2:p:239-61

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