Is Three a Crowd? Competition among Regulators in Banking

Richard Rosen

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2003, vol. 35, issue 6, 967-98

Abstract: Banks are able to switch among three options for a primary federal regulator: the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the OCC. We examine why they switch and what the results of switches are. We find support for the hypothesis that competition among regulators has beneficial aspects. Regulators seem to specialize in offering banks that are changing strategy the ability to improve performance by switching regulators. There is also evidence that the ability to switch regulators allows banks to get away from bank examiners who desire a quiet life, that is, examiners who attempt to minimize the effort they spend on work.

Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Is three a crowd? competition among regulators in banking (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:35:y:2003:i:6:p:967-98

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking is currently edited by Robert deYoung, Paul Evans, Pok-Sang Lam and Kenneth D. West

More articles in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking from Blackwell Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and Christopher F. Baum ().