Institutions of Foreign Exchange Settlement in a Two-Country Model

Hiroshi Fujiki

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2006, vol. 38, issue 3, 697-719

Abstract: Fujiki (2003) extends the Freeman (1996) model to show that when combined, an elastic money supply in the foreign exchange market and an elastic money supply in the domestic credit market yield efficiency gains in monetary equilibrium. This paper discusses whether three other institutional designs could achieve the same improvement in efficiency: (1) a private arrangement based on a payment versus a payment settlement standard supported by central banks' free intraday credit, (2) a financial institution that provides a negotiable certificate of deposit, and (3) a currency union.

Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/mcb.2006.0043 full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:38:y:2006:i:3:p:697-719

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking is currently edited by Robert deYoung, Paul Evans, Pok-Sang Lam and Kenneth D. West

More articles in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking from Blackwell Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and Christopher F. Baum ().