Who Should Act as Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model: A Comment

Charles Kahn and Joao Santos

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2006, vol. 38, issue 4, 1111-1118

Abstract: Researchers have pointed out that conflicts between the objectives of different bank regulators necessitate careful design of the institutional allocation of regulatory authority. In doing this, however, they often assume that regulators have incentives to share their private information regarding regulated banks. Our paper shows that the very same considerations that lead bank regulators to make different policy choices render the information-sharing assumption invalid. We further show that this result has important implications for the institutional allocation of lending of last resort, deposit insurance, and bank supervision.

Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/mcb.2006.0057 full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:38:y:2006:i:4:p:1111-1118

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking is currently edited by Robert deYoung, Paul Evans, Pok-Sang Lam and Kenneth D. West

More articles in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking from Blackwell Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and Christopher F. Baum ().