Stock Market Reaction to Financial Statement Certification by Bank Holding Company CEOs

Beverly Hirtle

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2006, vol. 38, issue 5, 1263-1291

Abstract: In 2002, the SEC mandated that the CEOs of large, publicly traded firms certify the accuracy of their company financial statements. The SEC's certification order provides a natural experiment that gives insight into the question of whether banks are opaque. We find that the BHCs subject to the SEC's order experienced positive and significant average abnormal returns from certification. Characteristics associated with greater opaqueness-liquid asset holdings, information-intensive lending, and split credit ratings-are systematically associated with the size of abnormal returns.

Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/mcb.2006.0072 full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Stock market reaction to financial statement certification by bank holding company CEOs (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:38:y:2006:i:5:p:1263-1291

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking is currently edited by Robert deYoung, Paul Evans, Pok-Sang Lam and Kenneth D. West

More articles in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking from Blackwell Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and Christopher F. Baum ().