Political Turnover and the Stock Performance of SOEs in China

Danli Wang and Terence Tai Leung Chong

Chinese Economy, 2017, vol. 50, issue 1, 21-33

Abstract: This article analyzes the reasons behind the long-term underperformance of China’s stock market. We argue that the price growth of local state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is hindered by the control of state shares by local cadres who often sell the shares below market prices during their time in office. Our empirical analysis reveals that political turnover of the prefectural party secretary has a significantly negative impact on the selling of state-owned shares and the price growth of local state-owned enterprises, while there is no such impact on private enterprises and state-owned enterprises controlled by the central government.

Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/10971475.2016.1211903 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Political Turnover and the Stock Performance of SOEs in China (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mes:chinec:v:50:y:2017:i:1:p:21-33

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/MCES20

DOI: 10.1080/10971475.2016.1211903

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Chinese Economy from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().