Ownership and Control Structures in Transition to "Crony” Capitalism: The Case of Bulgaria

Evgeni Peev

Eastern European Economics, 2002, vol. 40, issue 5, 73-91

Abstract: The transformation of the Bulgarian economy has been hampered by a process of privatization that created crony capitalism, which is characterized by the lack of appropriate capital market institutions and by ownership objectives and behaviors that are inappropriate to a market economy. How such forms of ownership developed and how they hamper the development of a true market economy in Bulgaria are discussed.Some policies for creating better ownership forms are also examined.

Date: 2002
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