Why Do Farmers Seek Office? Regulatory Capture in Russian Agricultural Subsidization
Vasyl Kvartiuk and
Eastern European Economics, 2023, vol. 61, issue 2, 111-130
This study examines whether Russian farmers who enter regional politics can skew local policies in their favor. We hypothesize that Russian regions with more local members of parliament (MPs) owning agricultural businesses and farmer-ministers are more likely to allocate higher agricultural subsidies. To test these hypotheses, we use a unique 2008–2015 panel dataset on agricultural subsidies in combination with qualitative data. We find that the pervasiveness of agricultural interest in local parliaments affects the size of agricultural subsidies. Regional agriculture ministers who own farms may play the role of “gatekeepers” to the subsidies.
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Journal Article: Why do farmers seek office? Regulatory capture in Russian agricultural subsidization (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mes:eaeuec:v:61:y:2023:i:2:p:111-130
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