What Happens to Listed Firms When Their Managers or Board Members Join Politics?

Krzysztof Jackowicz and Łukasz Kozłowski

Eastern European Economics, 2025, vol. 63, issue 2, 153-181

Abstract: We examine the consequences of a firm’s manager or board members transferring to politics. If social ties with ex-employers can withstand the test of time, the new political powers of former managers and board members would benefit their past companies. If not, these transfers mean losing well-connected and valuable employees, which is detrimental to the concerned companies. Using a new dataset covering listed firms in 11 Central European economies during 2008–2019, we find evidence supporting the latter supposition. Specifically, transfers to politics lower debt dynamics and slow down investment.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mes:eaeuec:v:63:y:2025:i:2:p:153-181

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DOI: 10.1080/00128775.2023.2279211

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