Understanding Central Bank Independence

Wesley C. Marshall and Louis-Philippe Rochon

International Journal of Political Economy, 2022, vol. 51, issue 4, 346-373

Abstract: This article asks a simple question that does not have a simple answer: whose interests do independent central banks serve? Employing a Polanyian lens, we explore the many facets of independent central banks, including their history, their institutional nature and functions, and the academic debate surrounding them, in order to reach several conclusions that can hopefully continue to expand the debate regarding the issue.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mes:ijpoec:v:51:y:2022:i:4:p:346-373

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DOI: 10.1080/08911916.2022.2137352

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