Good Policy or Good Luck? Why Inflation Fell Without a Recession

Thomas Ferguson and Servaas Storm

International Journal of Political Economy, 2024, vol. 53, issue 4, 311-341

Abstract: This article analyzes claims that the Federal Reserve is principally responsible for the decline of inflation in the U.S. We compare several different quantitative approaches. These show that at most the Fed could plausibly claim credit for somewhere between twenty and forty percent of the decline. The article then examines claims by central bankers and their supporters that a steadfast Fed commitment to keeping inflationary expectations anchored played a key role in the process. The article shows that it did not. The Fed’s own surveys show that low-income Americans did not believe assurances from the Fed or anyone else that inflation was anchored. Instead, what does explain much of the decline is the simple fact that most workers nowadays cannot protect themselves by bargaining for higher wages. The article then takes up the obvious question of why steep rises in interest rates have not so far led to big rises in unemployment. We show that recent arguments by Benigno and Eggertson that shifts in vacancy rates can explain this are inconsistent with the evidence. The biggest factor in accounting for the strength in the economy is the continuing importance of the wealth effect in sustaining consumption by the affluent. This arises, as we have emphasized in several papers, from the Fed’s quantitative easing policies. Absent sharp declines in wealth, this wealth effect is likely to feed service sector inflation in particular, even as a majority of households in America’s dual economy find themselves mired in recessionary conditions.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/08911916.2024.2419240

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