The “Shallow Supranationalism” of EU State Aid Control in the Era of Crises: The Case of the Financial Sector

Athanasios Kolliopoulos

International Journal of Political Economy, 2025, vol. 54, issue 1, 89-108

Abstract: State aid control is one of the few supranational policy domains from the very beginning of the European Economic Community. The EU Commission’s central role to protect the internal market was reaffirmed during the crises of the past fifteen years. However, the absence of an EU permanent central fiscal capacity means that state aid measures remain practically the only way to protect member states' domestic business. In the banking sector especially, the EU Commission has deployed a very relaxed stance against the governments’ support to banks. On the other hand, the European Banking Union endorses a more supranational character. This contradiction produces many implications for the EU rescue and resolution framework, and for the internal banking market as well. To strike a balance, the Commission holds its de jure centralized role, but member states assume de facto the command of domestic state aid strategies. Therefore, a “shallow supranationalism” is emerging.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/08911916.2025.2476402

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