How Do Rulers Choose? Dual Domains of Discretion in Political Decision Making

Christopher Coyne and Peter Leeson

Journal of Economic Issues, 2008, vol. 42, issue 3, 727-743

Abstract: This paper investigates the factors that drive ruler decision making under democracy. By dividing politicians’ actions into two distinct domains and exploring their compositions, we construct a fuller and more realistic picture of politician decision making. In the non-discretionary domain, the politician’s actions are clearly limited by voter desires; in the discretionary domain the politician is free to make choices as he chooses without voter repercussions. Standard neoclassical models of political behavior suggest that when votes don’t matter, monetary income drives ruler behavior. While monetary pursuit may explain some ruler decisions, it leaves many other observed choices unexplained. Our non-discretionary/discretionary dichotomy highlights the up-to-now neglected role that psychic income plays in explaining otherwise unexplained ruler decisions. The case studies considered support this view.

Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1080/00213624.2008.11507176

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