Niccolò Machiavelli and the Origins of Mechanism Design

Samuel Bowles

Journal of Economic Issues, 2014, vol. 48, issue 2, 267-278

Abstract: In matters of public policy, economists often design incentives and constraints so that economic actors with unrestricted preferences (including the self-interested motivations of homo economicus) will implement socially desired allocations. This paradigm, which dates to Machiavelli, contrasts sharply with an earlier approach, initiated by Aristotle, in which good governance entailed the cultivation of good citizens. Modern mechanism design, contract theory, and behavioral economics provide a critical perspective on the Machiavellian paradigm, and suggest a reformulation along more Aristotelian lines.

Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2753/JEI0021-3624480202 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mes:jeciss:v:48:y:2014:i:2:p:267-278

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/MJEI20

DOI: 10.2753/JEI0021-3624480202

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Economic Issues from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().