EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Financial Liberalization as a Process of Flawed Institutional Change

Faruk Ülgen

Journal of Economic Issues, 2016, vol. 50, issue 2, 485-493

Abstract: I argue that the financial liberalization of the last decades, which resulted in a worldwide crisis, relied on an institutional change that ill-shaped actors’ behavior so as to let them enter into unsustainable speculative activities at the expense of macro-stability. To support such an assertion, I draw upon a specific Veblen-Minsky approach to a credit-money economy and its endogenous fragilities. I also maintain that, when financial markets are liberalized and private-interestsrelated self-regulation replaces public macro-prudential supervision, the financial system undergoes institutional deadlock and the ensuing confusion is transformed into a market gridlock. Markets then become unable to recover without public rescue operations of banks. The subsequent negative economic and social consequences are beyond the limits of any acceptable liberal ideology and scientific understanding. Therefore, systemic stability calls for a tighter macro-regulatory framework to remove the domination of speculative finance over economic decisions and activities.

Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/00213624.2016.1179055 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Financial liberalization as a process of flawed institutional change (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mes:jeciss:v:50:y:2016:i:2:p:485-493

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/MJEI20

DOI: 10.1080/00213624.2016.1179055

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Economic Issues from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:mes:jeciss:v:50:y:2016:i:2:p:485-493