The Influence of Vested Interests on Healthcare Legislation in the USA, 2009–2010

Antoon Spithoven

Journal of Economic Issues, 2016, vol. 50, issue 2, 630-638

Abstract: Collective lobbying organizations and some big companies acted as cautious partners in the design of the Affordable Care Act of the Obama Administration. In addition to being consulted by government executives, these entities intensively lobbied legislators. The qualitative and statistical analysis I conduct here shows a positive impact of healthcare lobbying. Collective lobbying organizations have a significant impact on lawmaking and complementary lobbying enhances their impact. However, not all (disjointed) lobbying is successful. Perspective-based distortion might explain why organizations lobby on issues against all odds of ever being effective.

Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/00213624.2016.1179073 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mes:jeciss:v:50:y:2016:i:2:p:630-638

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/MJEI20

DOI: 10.1080/00213624.2016.1179073

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Economic Issues from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().