Commons, Collective Action, and Corruption

Philippe Broda

Journal of Economic Issues, 2016, vol. 50, issue 3, 769-787

Abstract: John R. Commons tried to save capitalism by making it good. His career was characterized by a sustained attempt to reduce social inequality by promoting collective action. Thanks to his proximity to the terrain, Commons often found himself close to authentic examples of corruption. Indeed, in his published works, corruption was treated exclusively from this perspective. His analysis reveals that collective action is not only the cause, but also the consequence of corruption, and that, in addition, the struggle against corruption is dependent on collective action for its success. I argue that Commons’s position is diametrically opposed to the theses developed later by Nathaniel Leff and Samuel Huntington. For Commons, the main issue is not that there is too much control over individual actions, but that there is too little.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1080/00213624.2016.1213585

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