Rethinking John R. Commons’s Theory of Collective Action: The Viewpoint of Regulation and Convention

Takayuki Nakahara

Journal of Economic Issues, 2018, vol. 52, issue 2, 405-412

Abstract: This article examines the theoretical connection between John R. Commons, régulation theory, and convention theory. In institutional economics (Commons 1934), by applying the idea of “multiple causation,” Commons approached macro-dynamics based on the expansion of some key concepts and studies on income distribution and demand growth. It is a prototype of the growth analysis based on the cumulative causation model, with the various forms of coordination later formulated by régulation theory. The two-layered coordination in convention theory attempted to explicitly explain the individuals’ reflexive capacities to change preference endogenously and to evaluate collective and social value, which were implicitly assumed in Commons’s term “intellect.”

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1080/00213624.2018.1469887

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