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What Makes Capital Account Regulation Effective? Comparing the Experiences of Brazil, Peru, and Iceland

Pablo Aguirre and José Antonio Alonso

Journal of Economic Issues, 2020, vol. 54, issue 3, 772-797

Abstract: Empirical studies confirm that the impact of capital account regulation (CAR) is highly case-specific, which underlines the need to identify the determinants of CAR effectiveness in greater depth. Coming from a political economy perspective, this article aims to contribute to this subject by comparing three experiences of intense regulation: Brazil (2008-2013), Peru (2008-2013), and Iceland (2008-2017). The main result encountered is that the bargaining power of the different sectors involved in regulation represents a crucial factor in explaining the impact of this policy. Furthermore, domestic banks play an important role in the effectiveness of capital account regulation.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/00213624.2020.1787052

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Handle: RePEc:mes:jeciss:v:54:y:2020:i:3:p:772-797