EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Dysfunctional Markets: A Spray of Prey Perspective

Olivier Mesly, David W. Shanafelt and Nicolas Huck

Journal of Economic Issues, 2021, vol. 55, issue 3, 797-819

Abstract: We revisit the theory of financial crises using a predator-prey metaphor, highlighting the relationship between greed, risk aversion and debt accumulation and aggregating concepts from economics, finance and psychology. We argue that regulations that are implemented inefficiently, with weak enforcement or at the wrong time can have deleterious effects on the market, worsening the ailment they initially intended to correct and leaving a spray of prey in their wake. To illustrate our hypothesis, we examine the role of regulations in the years leading up to and during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in the United States, when the Federal Reserve tried to restrain the over-heated housing market propelled by the predatory mortgage frenzy and the increased use of securitization in risk-hiding financial tools such as Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). Our results indicate that deleterious government interventions may act as a chemotherapy of sorts, causing harm followed by a slow recovery. This understanding can help governments draft better regulations to lower market frictions and better protect investors.

Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/00213624.2021.1948272 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mes:jeciss:v:55:y:2021:i:3:p:797-819

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/MJEI20

DOI: 10.1080/00213624.2021.1948272

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Economic Issues from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:mes:jeciss:v:55:y:2021:i:3:p:797-819