Are Modern Central Banks too Powerful for their Own Good? A Political Economy Approach to the Desirability and Limits of All-Powerful Central Banks

Henrique Estides Delgado

Journal of Economic Issues, 2022, vol. 56, issue 4, 1103-1117

Abstract: The aim of this article is to examine the level of power enjoyed nowadays by central banks. In a first section I go through the different sources of this power, analyzing their evolution during the first decade following the 2008 global financial crisis. A second section assesses the pros and cons of this new status. Finally, I conclude by offering a political economic account of the overall desirability underpinning the choice of having extremely powerful central banks, a pattern that has been reaffirmed in the 2020 global COVID crisis.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mes:jeciss:v:56:y:2022:i:4:p:1103-1117

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DOI: 10.1080/00213624.2022.2118496

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