How to Improve Utility Performance: Understanding Structural, Governance and Regulatory Incentives in Kenya Power and Kenya

Peter Twesigye

Journal of Economic Issues, 2024, vol. 58, issue 3, 922-946

Abstract: The power sectors in most African countries face an enduring problem of poor utility performance. Empirical findings show that the structural, governance, and regulatory reforms that previously created incentives for improved utility performance are increasingly threatened by political influence. Kenya Power’s financial viability has deteriorated in recent years and the regulator has been undermined. One of my major conclusions is that when the relationship between the government and utility is well understood and the agent is properly incentivized, performance improvements are possible. However, when the principal undermines or muddies those incentives through conflicting political interventions, performance improvements can be reversed.

Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/00213624.2024.2382042 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mes:jeciss:v:58:y:2024:i:3:p:922-946

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/MJEI20

DOI: 10.1080/00213624.2024.2382042

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Economic Issues from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().