Economic Hegemony and the Institutionalization of Law-Infringement

Clotilde Champeyrache

Journal of Economic Issues, 2025, vol. 59, issue 1, 71-85

Abstract: This article aims to take note of a twofold process: that by which economic hegemony—defined as the will of economists to appropriate all the themes of reflection and to have economic tools adopted by the other social sciences—leads to a disentangling of the legal-economic nexus dear to original institutionalism; and this disentanglement uses precisely the mechanisms of institutionalization of habits of thought highlighted by Thorstein Veblen. Indeed, the economic discourse, carried by an institutional articulation ensuring the primacy of economic values, models the habit of thought and leads to an internalization of the cost-benefit rule developed by the theory of rational choice in the mentality common to the generality of men. The ultimate consequence of this double process is the legitimization of law-infringement in the name of economic rationality and the setting up of a de facto market for transgression that trivializes and justifies law-infringement.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/00213624.2025.2455664

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