Appendix I

The Editors

Japanese Economy, 1996, vol. 24, issue 4, 97-101

Abstract: This appendix presents a formal (heuristic) model of two players. Each player has a fixed endowment Zi (i = 1, 2) which he can consume by himself, but he can increase his utility if he can get a favor Zj from the other player (i ≠ j). However, the other player wants to receive something back in the form of a favor Zi . The i-th player gives a part of his endowment for Zi . Obviously, each player is in a trade-off position with respect to (Z1, Z2 ).

Date: 1996
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DOI: 10.2753/JES1097-203X240497

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