Sword and Shield: The WTO Dispute Settlement System and Japan

Saadia Pekkanen

Japanese Economy, 2000, vol. 28, issue 5, 3-26

Abstract: At its inception in 1995, few predicted that the World Trade Organization (WTO) would be as widely used by its members as it is today. Between 1995 and 2001, the WTO presided over more complaints than its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), had over a forty-year period.1 Observing this trend at the close of the 1990s, many scholars—supporters and skeptics alike—agreed that ruled-based dispute settlement had moved to the center stage of international economic diplomacy, and that there were significant economic, political, and legal advantages to this progressive "judicialization" from the perspective of national governments (Jackson 1998a, pp. 175, 178-79; Petersmann 1998 [1997], pp. 84-87).

Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.2753/JES1097-203X28053

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