Plurality Rule, Majority Principle and Indeterminacy in German Elections

Salvatore Barbaro () and Nils D. Steiner

FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, 2023, vol. 79, issue 1, 64-91

Abstract: In German federal elections, district representatives are chosen by plurality rule - a voting system that can fail to select the Condorcet winner. With heightened party system fragmentation, violations of the Condorcet criterion may become increasingly frequent. In light of the "horseshoe theory", it also becomes questionable whether Condorcet winners exist in the first place. In this study, we simulate preference orderings over district candidates for the 2017 Bundestag election based on survey data. The simulation identifies Condorcet winners in every district and indicates that plurality rule fails to select those in about one in ten districts.

Keywords: elections; Condorcetwinners; pluralityrule; simple-majorityrule; indeterminacy; horseshoetheory; Germannationalelections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1628/fa-2023-0001

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