The European Fiscal Rules and their Complexity - A Systematic Discussion
Julia del Amo Valor,
Marcos Martín Mateos,
Diego Martínez and
Javier Pérez
FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, 2024, vol. 80, issue 2, 234-258
Abstract:
One of the most discussed subjects within the European Fiscal Rules' debate is whether the framework is too complex. In this paper, using a database of more than 200 papers, we argue that "complexity" can be defined along three axes: "framework set-up", "compliance", and "enforcement". Using this framework, we evaluate the new EU's economic governance framework. Our assessment indicates that the proposal simplifies elements along the first axis but provides less clear gains in terms of complexity along the two other ones. Finally, we provide some tentative explanations to understand why the complexity of the framework has grown over time, based on literature dealing with "complexity" in other areas.
Keywords: complexity; fiscal rules; economic governance framework; European Union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H6 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:doi:10.1628/fa-2024-0010
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DOI: 10.1628/fa-2024-0010
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